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What is Knowledge?
QUASSIM CASSAM
1.
What would a good answer to this question – call it (WK) – look like?
What I’m going to call the standard analytic approach (SA) says that:
(A) The way to answer WK is to analyse the concept of
knowledge.
(B) To analyse the concept of knowledge is to come up with non-
circular necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for someone to
know that something is the case.
Is the standard analytic approach to WK the right approach? If not,
what would be a better way of doing things? These are the questions
I’m going to tackle here. I want to look at some criticisms of SA and
consider the prospects for a different, non-standard analytic approach
(NA) to WK.
Here is one objection to SA: the concept of knowledge can’t be ana-
lysed, at least if analysis is understood in theway that (B) understands
it.1 (B) assumes a reductive conception of analysis, according towhich
analysing a concept is a matter of breaking it down into more basic
concepts. Let’s say that a concept C1 is more basic than another
concept C2 just if one can grasp C1 without grasping C2 but one
can’t grasp C2 without grasping C1. Proponents of SA tend to
assume that concepts like truth, belief, and justiﬁcation are in this
sense more basic than the concept knows and that that is why they
can be used to specify non-circular necessary and sufﬁcient con-
ditions for knowing. If it turns out that such conditions can’t be
given, and therefore that the concept of knowledge can’t be analysed,
the net result of combining (A) and (B) will be to make WK unans-
werable. If this question is one that we are capable of answering
then there must be some other way of answering it.
This objection to SA raises the following questions:
1 SeeWilliamson 2000: 27–33 for a defence of the view that the concept
of knowledge can’t be analysed into more basic concepts.
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(1) Is it true that the concept of knowledge can’t be reductively
analysed?
(2) How should WK be tackled if not by giving a reductive
analysis of the concept of knowledge?
The ﬁrst of these questions will be the focus of part 2. I will focus, in
particular, on some ofWilliamson’s arguments for what I am going to
call the Unanalysability Hypothesis (UH), the hypothesis that the
concept of knowledge can’t analysed in more basic terms. I’m
going to suggest that these arguments are less than conclusive.
(2) is worth asking even if one isn’t convinced that the answer to (1)
is ‘yes’. It might be that the concept of knowledge can be reductively
analysed but that analysing it in this way isn’t the best way of tackling
WK. I will consider this possibility in part 3. The upshot is that there
are different reasons for rejecting (A). One might do so because one
thinks that it requires us to do something that can’t be done or
simply because one is convinced that there are better ways of tackling
WK. The alternative approach that I want to consider – NA – is still
broadly ‘analytic’ in its orientation. It agrees that the key to answering
WK is to analyse the concept of knowledge but doesn’t think of con-
ceptual analysis in the way that SA thinks of it. So it rejects (B).2
What would it be to analyse a concept if not to come up with non-
circular necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for its application? The
usual answer to this question is that the aim of an analysis should
be to provide us with a reﬂective understanding of a concept, and
that the way to achieve that is to elucidate the concept rather than,
in the traditional sense, to give an analysis of it.3 So what is it to elu-
cidate a concept? One idea is that it is matter of tracing links between
it and other concepts that need not be any more basic. This is how
Strawson sees things in this passage:
Let us imagine. . . the model of an elaborate network, a system, of
connected items, concepts, such that the function of each item,
each concept, could. . . be properly understood only by grasping
its connections with the others, its place in the system – perhaps
better still, the picture of a set of interlocking systems of such a
kind. If this becomes our model, then there will be no reason to
2 There are also non-analytic, naturalistic alternatives to SA that argue
that we should focus directly on ‘knowledge itself’ (Kornblith 2002: 1) rather
than on the concept of knowledge but I won’t be looking at such views here.
3 As Williamson remarks, it doesn’t follow from the fact that the
concept knows cannot be analysed intomore basic concepts that ‘no reﬂective
understanding of it is possible’ (2000: 33).
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beworried if, in the process of tracing connections from one point
to another of the network, we ﬁnd ourselves returning to, or
passing through, our starting-point. We might ﬁnd, for
example, that we could not fully elucidate the concept of
knowledge without reference to the concept of sense perception;
and that we could not explain all the features of the concept of
sense perception without reference to the concept of knowledge.
But this might be an unworrying and unsurprising fact
(1992: 19).
What Strawson is setting out in this passage is a picture of non-
reductive conceptual analysis. And one way of understanding NA is
to understand it as endorsing (A) with the proviso that analysis is
understood along Strawsonian lines rather than along the lines of (B).
The problem with all this talk of non-reductive conceptual analy-
sis, of the project of elucidating the concept the concept of knowl-
edge, is that it is vague and metaphorical. It’s all very well talking
about the project of tracing connections between concepts but what
does this mean in practice? What is the precise nature of the links
that the non-reductive story describes and what are the results of elu-
cidating the concept of knowledge? In other words, what is the actual
answer to WK that Strawson is proposing? We have the suggestion
that the concepts of knowledge and of sense perception are closely
related but it’s not clear in what sense this is so and how important
it is. We might think, for example, that knowledge and perception
are connected because knowledge is what perception gives us but
does that cast any light on what knowledge is? And where do other
sources of knowledge – testimony, reasoning, etc. – ﬁt into the
overall story?
These are some of the questions that I will be addressing in part 4,
where I will outline a version of NA that builds on two ideas: one is
that elucidating the concept of knowledge is, at least in part, a matter
of getting a grip on the notion of a way of knowing. The other is that
ways of knowing are what we appeal to when we want to explain how
someone knows, that is, when we want to answer the question ‘How
does X know?’. Only some answers to questions of this form are good
answers. NA says that understanding what counts as a good answer is
the key to understanding what knowledge fundamentally is.
Perception is important in this connection because of the efﬁcacy of
perceptual explanations of much of our knowledge of the world
around us. But before spelling out these thoughts let’s focus on SA
and, in particular, on the response to SA that says that the concept
of knowledge can’t be analysed.
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2.
InKnowledge and its Limits, Williamson defends UH. If he succeeds
in making it plausible that ‘the concept knows cannot be analysed into
more basic concepts’ (33) then SA is in trouble.4 Analysing the
concept of knowledge into more basic concepts can’t be the best
way of tackling WK if the concept of knowledge can’t be analysed
into more basic concepts. But how good are Williamson’s arguments
in support of UH? There are three arguments that we need to con-
sider. The ﬁrst is what I am going to call the Distinct Concepts
Argument (DCA). This argument assumes that every standard analy-
sis of the concept of knowledge equates it with a conjunctive concept
like justiﬁed true belief. The aim of DCA is then to show that every
standard analysis of knows is ‘incorrect as a claim of concept identity,
for the analysing concept is distinct from the concept to be analysed’
(34). Then there is the Inductive Argument. This says that ‘experi-
ence conﬁrms inductively. . . that no analysis of the concept knows
of the standard kind is correct’ (30). Finally, there is the False
Expectations Argument. The point here is that one should not
expect the concept knows to have a non-trivial analysis in more
basic terms. Few concepts have such analyses, and there is no
special reason to expect knows to be one of them.
Is DCA any good? This argument relies on the notion of a mental
concept, so let’s start by brieﬂy considering this notion. Although
Williamson doesn’t attempt a formal deﬁnition, he does say at one
point that the concept true is not mental because ‘it makes no refer-
ence to a subject’ (30). So a concept won’t count as mental unless it
refers to a subject. This is obviously a long way from constituting a
deﬁnition of the notion of a mental concept, but Williamson’s idea
is presumably that we have an intuitive grasp of what mental con-
cepts are, and that this is enough for the purposes of DCA. Now
consider the case of a concept C which is the conjunction of the
concepts C1, . . . , Cn. Williamson’s proposal is that ‘C is mental if
and only if each Ci is mental’ (29). On this account, believes truly
is not a mental concept of a state since true isn’t a mental
concept. By the same token, has a justiﬁed true belief is not a
mental concept. These concepts are not mental because they have
‘irredundant non-mental constituents, in particular the concept
true’(30).
Having accepted that believes truly and has a justiﬁed true belief
aren’t mental concepts, let’s also accept, at least for the sake of
4 All references in this form are to page numbers in Williamson 2000.
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argument, that knows is a mental concept. What follows from this?
What follows is that the concept knows can’t be the same concept as
the concept believes truly or the concept has a justiﬁed true belief.
The point is that if C is a mental concept and D is not a mental
concept, then they can’t be the same concept. But, as Williamson
sees things, every standard analysis of the concept of knowledge
takes it that this concept is the very same concept as some conjunctive
concept like has a justiﬁed true belief. So every standard analysis of the
concept knows is incorrect.
Crucially, it doesn’t matter for the purposes of this argument
which particular conjunctive concept the concept of knowledge is
equated with, as long as it has the concept true as a constituent. For
example, suppose that instead of equating the concept of knowledge
with the concept has a justiﬁed true belief one equates it with the
concept has a reliably caused true belief. Williamson’s argument
would still go through since ‘it applies to any of the concepts with
which the concept knows is equated by conjunctive analyses of the
standard kind’ (30). As long as the analysing concept is not mental,
it can’t be the same as the concept being analysed, and this is the
crux of DCA.
Here, then, is a breakdown of the main components of the Distinct
Concepts Argument:
(a) Every standard analysis of the concept knows equates it with
some conjunctive concept which has the concept true as a non-
redundant constituent.
(b) The concept true is not a mental concept.
(c) Any concept with a non-redundant non-mental constituent is
not a mental concept.
(d) So the conjunctive concepts with which the concept knows is
equated by analyses of the standard kind are not mental
concepts.
(e) The concept knows is a mental concept.
(f) A mental concept can’t be the very same concept as a non-
mental concept.
(g) So the mental concept knows can’t be the same concept as any
of the conjunctive concepts with which it is equated by stan-
dard analyses.
(h) So every standard analysis of the concept knows is incorrect.
To get a sense of what might be wrong with DCA consider the
following parallel line of reasoning: let us say that a marital status
concept is one that says something about an individual’s marital
status. So, for example, married, single, bachelor, separated and
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divorced are all marital status concepts. Where C is the conjunction
of the concepts C1, . . . , Cn, let us stipulate that C is a marital
status concept if and only if each Ci is a marital status concept.
On this account, unmarried man isn’t a marital status concept,
since man isn’t a marital status concept. Bachelor is a marital
status concept. So bachelor and unmarried man can’t be the
same concept.
Something has clearly gone wrong here, because bachelor and
unmarried man are identical if any concepts are. The point is this:
the sense in which unmarried man isn’t a marital status concept is
that it isn’t what might be called a pure marital status concept. It
isn’t a pure marital status concept because one of its constituents,
the concept man, isn’t a marital status concept. To put it another
way, to describe someone as an unmarried man is to say something
about his sex as well as his marital status. But if this is why unmarried
man isn’t a marital status concept, then bachelor isn’t a marital status
concept either; to describe someone as a bachelor is, after all, also to
say something about his sex as well as his marital status. So there is no
longer any basis for the claim that bachelor and unmarried man can’t
be the same concept.
This is where the parallel with DCA breaks down. Williamson
thinks that knows and has a justiﬁed true belief can’t be the same
concept because knows is a purely mental concept whereas concepts
like has a justiﬁed true belief aren’t ‘purely mental’ (30). On this
reading of DCA both (d) and (e) need to be slightly modiﬁed.
Premise (d) should be read as claiming that the conjunctive concepts
with which knows is equated by standard analyses aren’t purely
mental because they have at least one non-mental constituent. In con-
trast, (e) now needs to be read as the claim that the concept knows is
purely mental. The argument still goes through but is only as com-
pelling as the case for accepting this version of (e).
What is the argument for (e)? Williamson’s primary concern isn’t
to defend the thesis that the concept of knowledge is mental or
purely mental. His main claim is that knowing is a state of mind.
This is a metaphysical rather than a conceptual thesis, and he
doesn’t argue for the metaphysical thesis from ﬁrst principles. He
thinks that ‘our initial presumption should be that knowing is a
mental state’ (22), and then tries to disarm a range of arguments
against this presumption. He also concedes that it doesn’t follow
from the fact that knowing is a mental state that the concept knows
is mental in his sense. He nevertheless argues that someone who con-
cedes that knowing is a mental state ought to concede that the concept
knows is mental, that is, purely mental.
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Let’s call the presumption that knowing is a mental state
Williamson’s Presumption (WP). Strictly speaking, WP is not just
the presumption that knowing is a state ofmind. It is the presumption
that it is ‘merely a state of mind’ (21), that is, that ‘there is a mental
state being in which is necessary and sufﬁcient for knowing p’.
Presumably, it is only because knowing is ‘merely’ a state of mind
that the concept of knowing can plausibly be regarded as ‘purely’
mental. So everything depends on whether we should accept the
existence of an initial presumption to the effect that knowing is
merely mental.
Williamson claims that ‘prior to philosophical theory-building, we
learn the concept of the mental by examples’ (22). Our paradigms
include not just mental states such as pleasure and pain but also non-
factive propositional attitudes such as believing and desiring, that is,
attitudes that one can have to falsehoods. In contrast, knowing is
factive since one can only know that p if p is true. So how is it that
factive propositional attitudes are mental given that they are different
from non-factive attitudes and also from mental states which aren’t
attitudes at all? Williamson’s answer is that ‘factive attitudes have
so many similarities to non-factive attitudes that we should expect
them to constitute mental states too’ (22). Indeed, he maintains
that there are no pre-theoretical grounds for omitting factive prop-
ositional attitudes from the list of paradigmatic mental states. It ‘is
built into the natural understanding of the procedure by which the
concept of the mental is acquired’ (22) that the mental includes
knowing and other factive attitudes.
What are the similarities between factive and non-factive attitudes?
If attitudes are states of mind, then factive and non-factive attitudes
are states of mind. But this is not enough for Williamson’s purposes.
He needs to show that knowing is sufﬁciently similar to believing and
other non-factive attitudes to sustain the presumption that knowing is
merely a state of mind. This is where the idea that knowing is factive
might appear to be in conﬂict with the idea that it is merely a state of
mind. AsWilliamson’s own discussion illustrates, it takes a good deal
of sophisticated argument to weaken the prejudice that a factive atti-
tude can’t be merely a state of mind, and this is difﬁcult to reconcile
with the suggestion that we have a pre-theoretical commitment to the
idea that knowing is merely mental. Perhaps we don’t have a pre-
theoretical commitment either way, the concept of the ‘merely
mental’ being a philosophical construct rather than an everyday
notion.
There is also a question about the suggestion that WP is built into
the procedure by which the concept of the mental is acquired. The
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procedure thatWilliamson has in mind is that of learning the concept
of the mental by examples, but is this procedure sufﬁciently well-
deﬁned to sustain the suggestion that WP is built into it? Prior to
theory-building, what we acquire by example are concepts of particu-
lar types of mental state rather than the concept of the mental as such.
It’s arguable that the procedures by means of which we acquire the
concept of the mental leave it open whether knowing is mental in
the bland sense that there is a mental state being in which is merely
necessary for knowing or in the ‘unexpected’ (21) sense that there is
a mental state being in which is necessary and sufﬁcient for
knowing. To acquire the concept of the mental as such is to abstract
from the differences between different types of mental state, and this
already involves taking on theoretical commitments which might
properly be described as ‘philosophical’. If this is right, then it is
doubtful whether we have any conception of the mental as such,
prior to some philosophical theory-building.
This is not an argument for the falsity of (e). It is an argument for
the view that (e) hasn’t been shown to be true. And that’s not the only
thing that is wrong with DCA. Its ﬁrst premise is also dubious: it is
false that standard analyses of the concept of knowledge equate it with
some conjunctive concept that has the concept true as a non-
redundant constituent. Indeed, it’s hard to think of anyone in the tra-
dition that Williamson is discussing for whom concept-identity has
really been an issue. The crucial question for SA isn’t whether the
concept knows and, say, the concept has a justiﬁed true belief are iden-
tical but whether having a justiﬁed true belief that A is necessary and
sufﬁcient for knowing that A. One can think that a given conjunctive
concept provides necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for knowing
without thinking that that concept is ‘identical’ with the concept
knows, whatever that means.
The best way of showing that a given concept can be analysed is to
analyse it. Ever since Gettier refuted the justiﬁed-true-belief analysis
of knowledge in 1963 philosophers have been trying to come up with
a better analysis. The problem, according to Williamson, is that each
successive analysis has been overturned by new counterexamples.
This is the basis of the Inductive Argument for UH. This argument
claims that UH is conﬁrmed inductively by the long history of failed
attempts to provide correct necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for
knowing. There are two things that SA can say in reply to this.
The ﬁrst is that ﬁfty years isn’t a long time in philosophy, certainly
not long enough to justify Williamson’s pessimism about the pro-
spects for a reductive analysis of the concept of knowledge. The
second is that it needs to be argued and not just assumed that every
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existing analysis is a failure. Since it is obviously unreasonable to
expect anyone to demonstrate the inadequacy of every analysis that
has ever been proposed it’s tempting to look for a feature that all cur-
rently available analyses have in common and that would justify a
blanket rejection of them. This is where DCA comes into its own.
It purports to identify just such a feature: the presence of the
concept true in the analysandum of that every existing analysis of
the concept of knowledge. But DCA doesn’t work so it can’t be
used to justify the premise of the Inductive Argument. Indeed, if
DCA or any other such relatively a priori argument for UHwere suc-
cessful then the Inductive Argument would be superﬂuous.
That leaves the False Expectations Argument, which says that
there is no special reason to expect a reductive analysis of knows.
Given that truth and belief are necessary for knowledge, ‘we might
expect to reach a necessary and sufﬁcient condition by adding what-
ever knowing has which believing truly may lack’ (32). This expec-
tation is based on a fallacy, Williamson claims. For example,
‘although being coloured is a necessary but insufﬁcient condition
for being red, we cannot state a necessary and sufﬁcient condition
for being red by conjoining being coloured with other properties
speciﬁed without reference to red. Neither the equation ‘Red ¼
coloured þ X’ nor the equation ‘Knowledge ¼ true belief þ X’
need have a non-circular solution’ (3).
One question about this argument is whether the analogy with red
is appropriate. Since Locke introduced the distinction between
simple and complex ideas and insisted that simple ideas can’t be
broken down those who have gone in for reductive conceptual ana-
lyses have been careful to argue that only complex concepts are ana-
lysable. From this perspective red is the paradigm of a simple concept.
Its unanalysability should therefore come as no surprise but it doesn’t
follow that the concept knows can’t be analysed. More cautiously, it
does not follow that this concept can’t be analysed if it is complex
rather than simple. If knows is simple, or if there isn’t a viable
simple/complex distinction, then the False Expectations Argument
goes through. Yet Williamson doesn’t establish the simplicity of
knows or the unsustainability of the distinction between simple and
complex concepts. As things stand, therefore, the False
Expectations Argument is as inconclusive as all his other arguments
for UH.
None of this is to say that the concept of knowledge can be given a
reductive analysis. The question is whether it has been shown that it
can’t be, and hence that the answer to (1) is ‘yes’. Perhaps there are
better arguments against SA than the ones that Williamson gives
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but the discussion so far suggests that SA is still in the running. In
that case, perhaps it would be better for critics of SA to change the
focus of their attack. Instead of pressing the point that the concept
knows can’t be analysed, and that SA is a non-starter for this
reason, a different line of attack would be to concentrate on
whether giving a reductive analysis of the concept of knowledge is
the best way of tacklingWK even if, as I have been arguing, the possi-
bility of such an analysis hasn’t been ruled out. This is the point of
(2), and it is to this question that I now turn.
3.
WK is an example of what might be called a ‘what’ question, a ques-
tion of the form ‘what is X?’. There are many such questions that are
of interest both to philosophers and to non-philosophers. Is there
anything useful that can be said, in general terms, about the best
way of dealing with such questions? Perhaps not, given their sheer
variety. But maybe it would help to ﬁx ideas to compare WK with
another ‘what’ question that looks as though it is at least in the
same ball park as WK, namely, ‘what is depression?’ (WD).
Though not everyone will agree that WD is in the same ball park as
WK the comparison doesn’t look completely absurd, especially if
one is sympathetic to the idea that knowing is a state of mind. In
any case, just to get a sense of the different ways of dealing with a
‘what’ question let’s consider how one might go about tackling WD.
What would a good response to WD look like? People who ask this
question are generally interested in such things as the incidence,
symptoms, and causes of depression. These are the issues that a
helpful answer to WD might therefore be expected to address. One
might also expect a good answer to WD to mention the different
types of depression and the range of possible treatments. What one
would not expect is an analysis of the concept of depression in
more basic terms, a statement of non-circular necessary and sufﬁcient
conditions for being depressed. Even if the concept of depression can
be analysed it just doesn’t look as though an analysis is especially rel-
evant if the aim is to say something helpful in response to WD.
This is not to deny that for practical purposes clinicians need some-
thing like a deﬁnition of depression or at least criteria for diagnosing
it.5 Yet the standard deﬁnition – the one given in the American
5 Thanks to John Forrester for pressing this point and for drawing my
attention to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.
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Psychiatric Association’sDiagnostic and StatisticalManual ofMental
Disorders – doesn’t provide non-circular necessary and sufﬁcient
conditions for depression. Instead, it provides two lists of symptoms
and stipulates that a patient with major depression must experience at
least ﬁve of the nine symptoms just about every day for at least two
weeks. The emphasis is on necessary conditions rather than necessary
and sufﬁcient conditions, and the “deﬁnition” is circular: one of the
key criteria for major depression is that the patient is in a persistent
depressed mood.
How does this help withWK? At the very least it helps by showing
that there are questions of the form ‘what is X?’ that don’t call for an
analysis of the concept of an X. Saying that a question of this form
doesn’t call for an analysis of a concept of an X is different from
saying that this concept can’t be analysed. I haven’t said that the
concept of depression can’t be analysed, only that it needn’t be ana-
lysed for the purposes of answeringWD and that the standard clinical
deﬁnition of depression doesn’t in fact amount to a reductive analysis.
This suggests that there is at least nothing wrong in principle with the
idea that WK doesn’t call for a reductive analysis of the concept of
knowledge even if such an analysis hasn’t been shown to be
impossible.
It is true that defenders of SA are unlikely to be impressed by any of
this. There are at least three things they can say in defence of their
approach:
i. The analogy between WK andWD is no good because WD is
not usually understood as a philosophical question. When
WK is read in the way that philosophers tend to read it the
challenge is not just to say what knowledge is but to say
what it is in a special way. This is what Michael Williams is
getting at in his comment that ‘when we ask “What is knowl-
edge?” philosophically, we mean “Don’t just tell us ancillary
facts about knowledge: tell us what it is essentially”’(2001,
13). It is when WK is asked in this spirit that it calls for an
analysis of the concept of knowledge. In contrast, much of
what is usually said in response to WD consists in the speciﬁ-
cation of ancillary facts.
ii. If the concept of knowledge can’t be analysed then it’s fair
enough that one should be looking for a different approach
toWK. But what if we can ﬁnd non-circular necessary and suf-
ﬁcient conditions for knowing?Wouldn’t this be the best poss-
ible response toWK? How could a different response possibly
be any better? So critics of SA had better concentrate on
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showing that the concept of knowledge can’t be analysed.
There is no future in the idea that there are better ways of
dealing withWK if the concept of knowledge can be analysed.
iii. What, exactly, is the alternative to reductive conceptual analy-
sis in relation to WK? At least when it comes to WD we have
some idea of what the alternative looks like. Crudely, we can
say what depression is by specifying its functional role, its
inputs and outputs, causes and symptoms. Can WK be
given a functional response? If so, what would a functional
account of knowledge look like?
These are some of the challenges to which I now want to respond on
behalf of NA. Taking them in reverse order, the aim will be to
develop a non-reductive response to WK, to show how it can be at
least as illuminating as any reductive response, and to rebut the
charge that the non-reductive alternative to SA only succeeds in
telling us ancillary facts about knowledge. The non-reductive
approach to WK that I want to ﬂesh out has what might be
thought of as a broadly functional orientation but parallels with the
functional response to WD shouldn’t be exaggerated. The key isn’t
the function of knowledge but the explanation of knowledge. The pro-
posal is that we can elucidate the concept of knowledge in something
like Strawson’s sense, and therebywork towards an answer toWK, by
looking at what it takes to explain how someone knows, that is, to
answer the question ‘How does S know?’. The signiﬁcance of this
question for WK might not be immediately apparent but it will
hopefully become clearer below.
4.
In his paper “Other Minds”, Austin remarks that when we make an
assertion such as ‘There is a goldﬁnch in the garden’ or ‘He is
angry’ we imply that we know it. Hence:
On making such an assertion. . . we are directly exposed to ques-
tions such as (1) ‘Do you know there is?’ ‘Do you know he is?’ and
(2) ‘How do you know?’ If in answer to the ﬁrst question we reply
‘Yes’, we may be asked the second question, and even the ﬁrst
question alone is commonly taken as an invitation to state not
merely whether but also how we know (1979: 77).
It is no accident that such questions are normally appropriate. It is
something like a conceptual truth that someone who says or implies
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that he knows that P is exposed to the question ‘How do you know?’,
and this is something that any serious attempt to elucidate the
concept of knowledge had better take into account.6 Perhaps ‘I am
in pain’ is not exposed to this question but such assertions raise
special questions that I don’t want to go into here.7
Here are three issues that now need to be addressed:
(a) Can one still count as knowing that P if one doesn’t know how
one knows that P?
(b) What would count as a satisfactory answer to the question
‘How do you know?’
(g) What light does any of this cast on WK?
On (a), it’s true that people sometimes say ‘I don’t know how I know;
I just know’. We allow that the knower might not know the answer to
‘How do you know that P?’ but it is much harder to accept that there
doesn’t have to be an answer, known or unknown. Even our willing-
ness to tolerate cases in which the knower doesn’t know how he knows
has limits. In the primary sense of ‘knows’ the knower must know
how he knows even if he might have trouble articulating his
second-order knowledge.8
Why does it seem so compelling that when someone knows that P
there must be an answer to the question ‘How does he know that P?’.
The thought is that if someone knows then there must be something
in virtue of which he knows. That can then form the basis of a satis-
factory response to ‘How does he know?’. For example, if the concept
of knowledge can be analysed – say as justiﬁed true belief – then it
might be tempting to say that someone who knows that P does so
in virtue of having a justiﬁed true belief that P. But, apart from
worries about whether the concept of knowledge can be analysed,
it’s also worth pointing out that ‘by having a justiﬁed true belief
that P’ would not normally be taken to be a good answer to ‘How
does he know that P?’. The reason is that it doesn’t explain how he
knows even if (setting aside Gettier complications) it entails that he
knows. This brings us to (b).
Suppose, to take another one of Austin’s examples, I assert that
there is a bittern at the bottom of the garden and am asked how
I know. One answer would be ‘I can see it’. Another answer would
be ‘I can hear it’. Seeing that there is a bittern at the bottom of the
6 Cf. Williamson 2000: 252–3.
7 See Hampshire 1979 for further discussion.
8 Compare the account of ‘primary knowledge’ given in Ayers 1991:
139–44.
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garden or, if one prefers, simply seeing a bittern at the bottom of the
garden is a way of knowing that there is a bittern there. In general,
F-ing that P is a way of knowing that P just if it is possible satisfac-
torily to explain how S knows that P by pointing out that S Fs that
P.9 On this explanatory account of ways of knowing seeing that P is
clearly a way of knowing that P. Saying that I can see a bittern at
the bottom of the garden can explain how I know that there is one
there. Someone might question whether I see what I think I see
but once it’s agreed that I see a bittern then nothing further needs
to be done to explain my knowledge of its presence.
Ways of knowing needn’t be perceptual. I can know that P by
reading that P or by being told that P. Further, as Austin points
out, questions of the form ‘How does S know?’ don’t always elicit
answers of the form ‘S Fs’. ‘From its booming noise’ and ‘I was
brought up in the fens’ might be given as answers to ‘How do you
know there is a bittern in the garden?’. Strictly speaking, however,
the question to which the former is a response is ‘How can you tell
it’s a bittern?’, while the question to which ‘I was brought up in
the fens’ is a response is ‘How do you know about bitterns?’.
Neither is a satisfactory answer to ‘How do you know here and now
that there is a bittern at the bottom of the garden?’. Being brought
up is the fens is not a way of knowing that there is a bittern at the
bottom of the garden; it can’t be said that I was brought up in the
fens and thereby know that there is a bittern there.
Let’s agree, then, that a satisfactory response to ‘How do you
know?’ will need to identify one’s way of knowing and that ways of
knowing are usually expressed by sentences of the form ‘S Fs’
(where ‘F’ stands for a verb). There are some further points about
ways of knowing that are worth making:
I. Ways of knowing needn’t be propositional attitudes. I can
know that there is a bittern at the bottom of the garden by
seeing it but this kind of seeing isn’t propositional.
II. For F-ing that P to explain one’s knowledge that P it is
neither necessary nor sufﬁcient that ‘S Fs that P’ entails ‘S
know that P’. Not sufﬁcient: ‘S regrets that P’ entails ‘S
knows that P’ but saying that S regrets that P doesn’t
explain how S knows; regretting that P isn’t a way of
9 See Cassam 2007 for a defence of this approach to ways of knowing.
There are parallels between my explanatory conception of a way of
knowing and Goldman’s conception of an intellectual virtue. There is
more on this below.
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knowing that P.10 Not necessary: ‘S read that P’ can be a good
answer to ‘How does S know that P?’ despite not entailing
that S knows that P.
III. Most ways of knowing are ways of coming to know.11 Seeing
that P, hearing that P, reading that P are all ways of coming to
know that P. A possible exception is remembering that
P. How do I know that I went on safari last year? I remember.
Remembering going on safari is a way of knowing that I went
on safari but we might be reluctant to describe it as a way of
coming to know that I went on safari.
There is an obvious question that is raised by the discussion so far:
given the sheer variety of ways of knowing, of acceptable responses to
‘How do you know?’, what is their unifying principle? What do they
all have in common that makes them ways of knowing? The idea that
what ways of knowing that P have in common is that they all entail
that one knows that P has already been ruled out so where do we go
from here? One possibility is that there is nothing further to be
said. In practice we have no trouble distinguishing between accepta-
ble and unacceptable answers to ‘How do you know?’ but no further
explanation can be given as to why we accept the explanations that we
accept and reject the ones that we reject. There are good and bad
explanations of a person’s knowledge but our explanations cannot
themselves be explained; they have no deeper rationale or unifying
principle. I will call someone who argues in this way a minimalist.
Minimalism is hard to swallow. As we have seen, acceptable
answers to ‘How do you know that P?’ include ‘I perceive that P’
and ‘I read that P’. Unacceptable answers include ‘I guessed that P’
and ‘I imagine that P’. Is it really plausible that there is nothing
further to be said about why perceiving that P is a way of knowing
that P whereas guessing that P is not? It’s surely not irrelevant, for
example, that we regard perception as reliable, as delivering a high
ratio of true beliefs, whereas there is no temptation to suppose that
the same is true of imagination.12 I will come back to this. In the
meantime, there is another proposal to consider. This is the proposal
that ‘byF-ing’ is an acceptable answer to ‘How does X know that P?’
only ifF-ing is a way of coming to know that P. It might seem that this
has already been ruled out by the safari example but that’s not quite
10 Unger is someone who thinks that ‘S regrets that P’ entails ‘S knows
that P’. See Unger 1975: 158.
11 Barry Stroud is an example of someonewho treats ways of knowing as
ways of coming to know. See Stroud 2000: 3.
12 Cf. Goldman 1992.
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right. The discussion of that example assumed that ‘by remembering’
can be a good answer to ‘How do you know that P?’ and that remem-
bering that P is not a way of coming to know that P. Each of these
assumptions might be questioned. Perhaps it is never correct to say
‘I remember’ in response to ‘How do you know?’. Alternatively,
one might argue that it is sometimes correct to say this but only
because remembering that P can be a way of coming to know that P.
In what sense can remembering that P be a way of coming to know
that P? Suppose that P is the proposition ‘I am now on safari’. What is
true is that I do not come to know that I am now on safari by remem-
bering that I am. But what if P is ‘I was on safari’? In that case, I can
come to know that P by remembering that I was. Memory, like testi-
mony, is the source of one’s knowledge of many propositions of the
form ‘I was F’, just as perception is the source of one’s knowledge
of many propositions of the form ‘I am F’. Perception, memory
and testimony are all capable of yielding knowledge of the appropriate
propositions, and that is why seeing that P, remembering that P and
reading that P all count as ways of knowing that P.
This brings us, ﬁnally, to (g): what light does the explanatory
account of ways of knowing cast on WK? Here is one suggestion:
once we have an idea of the sorts of things that can yield the knowl-
edge that P we can then proceed to give an account on this basis of
what it is to know that P. In effect, this will be an account of
knowing in terms of ways of knowing. Snowdon considers something
like this possibility in a discussion of what he sees as the necessary link
between knowledge and perception. He says that evidence of such a
link ‘comes from our treating it as totally unproblematic that some-
one’s knowledge that P can be explained by saying that they saw
that P’ (1998: 301). This then leads to the suggestion that ‘our funda-
mental understanding of knowledge is as what is yielded by percep-
tion in certain circumstances’ (ibid.).13 This is a partly functional
response to WK.14 To say that knowledge is what perception gives
us is to give an account of knowledge in terms of its inputs. The
account is also non-reductive since it doesn’t say that the concept of
13 This is not Snowdon’s own view.
14 Thanks to Paul Snowdon for suggesting this characterization. A fully
functional account would need also to say something about the ‘outputs’ of
knowing. Just as inputs to knowledge are what explain how someone knows,
we can think of its outputs in terms of what attributions of knowledge enable
us to explain – action, for one. In this way one might hope to say something
useful about the value of knowledge. Merely talking about ways of knowing
won’t enable one to do that.
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perception is more basic than that of knowledge. Just as our funda-
mental understanding of knowledge is terms of its inputs so our fun-
damental understanding of perception is in terms of its outputs, the
key output being knowledge: ‘perceiving an object is, in its nature,
a way to get knowledge about the object’ (Snowdon 1998, 300).
One problem with this response to WK is that it neglects non-
perceptual sources of knowledge. However, such sources can easily
be accommodated by saying that knowledge is to be understood as
thatwhich is yielded by perception,memory, testimony, introspection,
calculation, and so on. To put it another way, to know that P is to be in
a state that one can get into in any number of different ways, for
example, by seeing that P, hearing that P, reading that P, calculating
that P, and so on. This is an explanatory conception of knowledge,
to go with the explanatory conception of ways of knowing: our
fundamental understanding of (propositional) knowledge is that it is
something whose possession by an individual can properly be
explained by reference to any one of an open-ended list of ways of
knowing or, if one prefers, ways of coming to know.15 Non-circular
necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for knowing are not to the point.
We now have a version of NA, that is, a non-standard analytic
response to WK. It’s an analytic response because it focuses on the
concept of knowledge. It’s a non-standard analytic response
because it doesn’t try to give a reductive analysis of the concept of
knows; instead, it seeks to elucidate this concept by relating it to
other concepts that are no more basic. Speciﬁcally, it elucidates the
concept of knowledge by relating it to the concept of a way of
knowing and to concepts of speciﬁc ways of knowing. It’s hard to
see why this non-reductive approach to WK should be seen as less
helpful or illuminating than the standard reductive approach or as
only telling us ancillary facts about knowledge. It is not an ancillary
15 The explanatory conception of knowledge builds on the thought that
‘a necessary condition of being in some states may be having entered them in
speciﬁc ways’ (Williamson 2000: 41). There are also parallels between the
idea that to know that P is to be in a state that one can get into in any
number of different ways and Williamson’s idea that ‘knowing that A is
seeing or remembering or. . . that A, if the list is understood as open-ended,
and the concept knows is not identiﬁed with the disjunctive concept’ (2000:
34). Seeing and remembering are what Williamson calls ‘ways of knowing’
but his conception of ways of knowing is different from mine. See Cassam
2007: part 3, for an account of the differences. Notice, ﬁnally, that the expla-
natory conception can allow that perceptual ways of knowing are privileged
in relation to some non-perceptual ways of knowing. See Cassam 2007 for
further discussion.
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fact about the knowledge that P that it can be acquired by seeing that
P. Clearly, there are lots of things about theworld around us that can’t
be known in this way but wemight still think that perception is a basic
source of our knowledge of many empirical propositions. In any case,
the present version of NA takes care not to ignore non-perceptual
ways of knowing.
The biggest challenge facing this approach toWK is to the sugges-
tion, or implication, that it can do without a reductive analysis of the
concept of knowledge and that it therefore has no need for SA. To put
it at its most abstract, the worry is that the concept of knowledge is
prior to that of a way of knowing and that any attempt to elucidate
the former by reference to the latter is doomed. For example,
suppose we say that seeing that P is a way of knowing that P
whereas wishfully thinking that P is not a way of knowing that
P. We might try to explain this difference by saying that only
seeing delivers a sufﬁciently high ratio of true beliefs but why
assume that reliability is relevant to ways of knowing? Surely this
assumption can only be justiﬁed by a prior analysis of the concept
of knowledge along reliabilist lines. If, as simple reliabilism says,
knowledge is true belief caused by a reliable process then it is not
hard to ﬁgure out why wishfully thinking that P isn’t a way of
knowing that P. But if simple reliabilism is correct then it already pro-
vides a standard analytic response toWKwithout reference toways of
knowing. So it seems that NA collapses into SA.
There are several things that are wrong with this line of argument.
To start with, it is false that a reliability condition on knowledge can
only be justiﬁed on the basis of a reductive analysis of the concept
knows. From the fact that reliability is necessary for knowledge it
doesn’t follow that a reductive analysis of the concept of knowledge
is possible.16 It is also debatable whether we can explain why seeing
counts a way of knowing solely in terms of reliability. Imagine that
I form beliefs about what is going on in distant parts on the world
on the basis of what my crystal ball tells me and that my crystal
ball is as reliable as ordinary seeing. On a particular occasion
I assert that the American President is in Iowa. My answer to ‘How
do you know?’ is ‘I can see in my crystal ball that he is in Iowa’. Is
this an acceptable answer? If not, then seeing in my crystal ball that
P is not a way of knowing that P. Yet seeing (in the ordinary sense)
that P is a way of knowing that P. Since (ex hypothesi) there is no
difference in reliability between ordinary seeing and crystal ball
gazing it can’t be maintained that it is sufﬁcient for ordinary seeing
16 Cf. Williamson 2000: 100.
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to be a way of knowing that it delivers a high ratio of true beliefs; one
can imagine crystal ball gazing or clairvoyance doing that.
In that case, what does explain the fact that seeing is a way of
knowing? To answer this question we can borrow some insights
from virtue epistemology. Virtue epistemologists like Goldman try
to give an account of the nature of justiﬁed belief. Their idea is that
a justiﬁed belief is one that is obtained through the exercise of intellec-
tual virtues but they do not propose a deﬁnition of intellectual virtue.
Instead, Goldman ‘posits a set of examples of virtues and vices as
opposed to a mere abstract characterization’ (1992: 158). Exemplary
intellectual virtues include ‘belief formation based on sight, hearing,
memory, reasoning in certain “approved” ways, and so forth’
(ibid.). Why do these count as intellectual virtues? Reliability is one
factor but it is also important that they are ways of obtaining knowl-
edge; they are belief-forming processes that would be ‘accepted as
answers to the question “How does X know”’(1992: 162). Novel or
unusual belief-forming processes are then evaluated as virtuous as
long as they are sufﬁciently similar to the exemplary virtues.
NA should think of ways of knowing somewhat in the way that
Goldman thinks of intellectual virtues. They are ways of obtaining
knowledge and they wouldn’t count as ways of obtaining knowledge
if they didn’t deliver a high ratio of true beliefs. But in ﬁguring out
what counts as a way of knowing we don’t start with a blank slate
and then work up to a list of ways of knowing on the basis of consider-
ations like reliability. The position is rather that we start with a list of
exemplary ways of knowing, exemplary responses to “How does X
know?” such as perceiving, and work up from there to the identiﬁ-
cation of further ways of knowing and ultimately to a more abstract
characterization of the notion of a way of knowing.17 On this
account, the status of exemplary ways of knowing such as perceiving
is not something that can be explained inmore basic terms. If our fun-
damental understanding of knowledge is as what perception gives us
then there is no question of perceiving that P failing to be a way of
knowing that P.18 And if this sounds like a sophisticated form of
17 It may well turn out on this account that seeing in one’s crystal ball
that P is a way of knowing that P. It all depends on whether this kind of
seeing is sufﬁciently similar to ordinary seeing. Sufﬁcient similarity will
include phenomenological similarity.
18 Even sceptics should accept the link between perceiving and
knowing. They should concentrate on the issue of whether it is ever possible
for us to see that P, where ‘P’ is a proposition about non-psychological
reality.
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minimalism then so be it. When it comes to explaining why certain
explanations of our knowledge are good ones there is only so far we
can go.19
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